Lawyers, the New Class, and the Constitution. by Glazer, Nathan
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Nat han Glazer * * 
This article is published by permission of Transaction, Inc. from The New Class?, 
B. Bruce-Briggs, editor, copyright (c) 1979 by Transaction, Inc., and reprinted in 
paperback by McGraw-Hill. It deals with a topic that is prominent in political 
and sociological literature, but virtually ignored in legal journals: the role of a 
"new class" of journalists, teachers, civil servants, and other highly educated peo-
ple who-although themselves relatively affluent and privileged--tend to favor 
liberal political and legal causes. The precise composition of this class, and in-
deed whether it exists at all, are controversial topics that are discussed from sev-
eral points of view in The New Class? Still more controversial is the question 
whether the growth of such a class is an occasion for celebration or alarm. Al-
though Professor Glazer's thesis is not limited to constitutional law, it obviously 
pertains to the modern expansion of constitutional rights. We think that readers 
of all political persuasions will find it interesting, and-because it is the kind of 
analysis that constitutional specialists rarely see-we are grateful that Professor 
Glazer and his publisher have allowed us to reprint it. Since the value of the 
thesis does not turn on statistical details, we have not troubled to bring these up to 
date. 
I had hoped, in analyzing a single occupational group that is 
generally regarded as a prominent element of the "new class," to 
escape the conceptual tangle with which many other contributors 
to this volume have manfully wrestled. After all, if the heart of 
the "new class" is found among the professional classes and the 
highly educated, and if the social forces that have helped create a 
"new class" include the increasingly larger scale of government, 
the expansion of regulation, and the increasing reach of rights and 
entitlements, would not lawyers be well qualified to be members 
of the "new class"? Could not one analyze their role to get a better 
grasp on the "new class" and what it means for society?t No such 
luck. The conceptual tangle around the "new class" persists when 
As originally published, this article was titled simply Lawyers and the New Class. 
•• Professor of Sociology, Harvard University. 
I. In a review of Irving Kristol's Two Cheers for Capitalism, Alben J. Sommers notes 
that Kristol places lawyers second among the categories making up the "new class." Som-
mers, Kristof clear, AcRoss THE BoARD, June 1978, at 66, 67. But Kristol qualifies their 
inclusion by specifying lawyers who make their careers in "the expanding public sector." I. 
KRJSTOL, Two CHEERS FOR CAPITALISM 15, 27 (1978). However, to the lawyer David T. 
Bazelon, lawyers epitomize the "new class." 
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we try to get a fix on a single occupational stratum; it must be 
cleared away before we can relate lawyers to the "new class" and 
its values, views, and role. 
Before considering the role that the "new class" -and law-
yers among it-might play in producing them, let me first list the 
social developments that critics of the "new class" regard nega-
tively: the expanding size of government; the animus, in parts of 
the media and among government administrators, against private 
business; the expanding regulation of business; the increasingly 
egalitarian taxing policies, particularly the policies limiting funds 
for investment and rewards for entreprenurial and investment suc-
cess; the downgrading of entreprenurial and business roles as non-
creative and useless for society; the bias against the market and in 
favor of government regulation as a form of control. 
Now the problem with this list or any other that might be 
made up is that in our legal system, a lawyer is inevitably on 
either side of any dispute. This certainly cannot be said of any 
other member-category of the "new class." The legal system alone 
guarantees an occupational division on almost any issue, a situa-
tion that is not as likely among intellectuals, professors, govern-
ment bureaucrats, scientists, social workers, planners, engineers, 
or what have you. This may explain the traditional antagonism to 
lawyers (in the old adage, one lawyer in a town will starve, while 
two will find a good living), but it does not explain why lawyers 
are uniformly included as members of the "new class." 
Aside from this formal problem, more serious difficulties 
arise when we look at the distribution of lawyers on both sides of 
issues involving regulation of business and expansion of state 
power: many more lawyers are on the side of business than on the 
side of government, and only a tiny fraction are in those numer-
ous but relatively small "public-interest" law firms whose aim is 
generally to badger government to become more restrictive of 
business. In a big case dealing with the environment, consumer 
interests, nondiscrimination or affirmative action in hiring, or 
some other characteristic issue in which government tries to con-
trol business, the resources expended on the side of private busi-
ness-in legal fees, in numbers of lawyers and researchers 
employed-are far greater, one can assume, than the resources 
spent by small public-interest law firms or even by major govern-
ment agencies. At times, government expenditures do match or 
exceed those of the private sector-when the target is a relatively 
small businessman. Generally, on any case regarded as vital to its 
interests, the big corporation can spend more than government 
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can or will. One wonders whether business is really getting much 
more results by employing such expensive legal talent, but it is 
beyond dispute that business can and does spend more than gov-
ernment or public-interest firms. 
At best, only a fraction of lawyers might be considered mem-
bers of the "new class" because of their roles or attitudes. To be-
gin with, a very substantial number are solo practitioners, about 
40% and rising, according to the American Bar Foundation.2 The 
solo practitioner is the typical small businessman, clearly the an-
tithesis of the "new class," however it may be characterized. He is 
antagonistic to what the "new class" has done through govern-
ment-its leveling taxes, its regulation and protection of employ-
ees, its demands for ever more reports and forms, its large plans 
for urban renewal and urban planning, which may wipe out his 
place of business. Not only is the solo practitioner a small busi-
nessman, but his chief clients are other small businessmen. An-
other substantial chunk of lawyers is in partnerships and small 
firms, equally small businesses. Another large group work in 
large firms employed by larger businesses and corporations and 
wealthy individuals. Another group are salaried lawyers for large 
business enterprises. We would certainly not include any of these 
categories in the neoconservative version of the "new class." 
What then remains from the category of lawyers to be consid-
ered as part of the "new class"? Two major groups, one quite 
large, one very small. The large group consists of lawyers who 
work for government-twenty thousand for the federal govern-
ment alone.J Many more are employed by state and local govern-
ments.4 Perhaps 20% of the lawyers in the nation are employed by 
government, and since they are engaged in defending its interests, 
writing its regulations, and negotiating with and prosecuting those 
who do not comply, and since much of their work does not deal 
2. Klein, Going Ir Alone, Wall St. J., June 2, 1978, at I, col. I, 33, col. 3. 
3. "At last count, there were 20,000 lawyers in the federal government engaged in 
the lawyer-like functions (excluding, I presume, employees with law degrees who do not 
practice law). Only approximately 4,000 of this group serve in the Department of Justice; 
the remainder are employed by 28 other federal government units which have or exercise 
authority to conduct at least some of their litigation." Speech by Assistant U.S. Attorney 
General Drew Days, Ill, before the District of Columbia Chapter of the Federal Bar Asso-
ciation (May I, 1978). 
4. The 1970 Census found 277,000 lawyers and judges, while the American Bar As-
sociation lists 432,000 in 1977, up from 355,000 in 1971. Klein, supra note 2, at I, col. I. 
Clearly, the number of members of the bar is larger than those who identified themselves 
as lawyers and judges to the census. The census did break down lawyers and judges by 
employer, and 19.2% worked for government---<i.8% for the federal government, and 5.4% 
for state and 6.9% for local governments. The proportion of lawyers working for govern-
ment has undoubtedly gone up since 1970. 
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with ordinary criminal activity (which both the "new class" and 
the old classes agree should be a concern of government), some 
government lawyers might be considered part of the "new class." 
But when people think of lawyers in the "new class," they 
have in mind another group: the lawyers who work for nonprofit 
reform groups or in government and foundation-supported law 
firms to defend the rights and interests of minorities, the poor, 
welfare recipients, public-housing tenants, environmentalists, con-
sumers, prisoners, the mentally ill, the mentally retarded, and 
other groups, and who have contributed mightily to a huge in-
crease in litigation, the expansion of rights, and the increasing re-
quirements for reporting and monitoring that have accompanied 
the establishment of new rights. These "public-interest" lawyers 
are the ones naturally regarded as being part of the "new class." 
They are seen as being particularly antagonistic to big business 
and business in general, because their pursuit of the interests of 
minorities, the poor, consumers, and the environment often places 
them in opposition to business as well as government.s 
The number of such lawyers, however, is remarkably small. 
There are 2,000 lawyers supported by the Legal Services Corpora-
tion, the heir of the poverty program. While these lawyers have 
played a substantial role in legal reform, the greater part of their 
activity is simply devoted to providing legal services to the poor 
for family, consumer, housing, and welfare problems. One-quar-
ter of their time is devoted to "law reform" work, such as chang-
ing regulations, getting new judgments about rights generally, 
filing class actions and test cases-all the activities that involve 
not, or not simply, personal legal service but the intent to change 
the pattern of law and regulation.6 
5. I place quotation marks around "public interest" because one cannot take it as a 
matter of course that their activities are in the public interest, even though they have appro-
priated the term and are generally given the right to use it. But when such lawyers litigate 
to get more welfare, or to lower rents, or to stop a new development on environmental 
grounds, or to insist on large investments for safety, a variety of interests are in conflict, all 
of which have some claim to being considered public interests-the defendant is not only 
soulless corporations or unfeeling governments, but the taxpayers who may pay more in 
taxes, the workers who may lose jobs, the communities that may be left with a high rate of 
unemployment. But since no alternative term comes to mind, and an overabundant use of 
quotations interferes with readability, I will reluctantly drop the quotes. 
Further muddying the term is the fact that a new group of public-interest law firms has 
been set up specifically to oppose the firms that grew out of the civil-rights, antipoveny, 
and environmental movements. These new firms are also supponed by individual and 
foundation contributions, are nonprofit, have salaried lawyers, contest key cases, and oper-
ate principally at the appellate level-but they defend general business and private inter-
ests against the expanding reach of governmental regulation. Although they have an equal 
right to claim that they act in the public interest, I will omit them from my discussion. 
6. J. HANDLER, LAWYERS AND THE PuRSUIT OF LEGAL RIGHTS 54-55 (1978). 
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More important than these lawyers are the public-interest 
lawyers who spend just about all their time in law-reform work. 
Their major interest is not a client but a pattern of law, regulation, 
and judicial interpretation affecting the condition of a class of 
people or interests they have undertaken to represent. A recent 
study that attempted to find every lawyer employed full-time by 
such groups between 1969 and 1973 found only 450 lawyers.? 
Even if we double or triple this number-and missed organiza-
tions and expansion since 1973 might permit such a radical up-
ward adjustment-the number of lawyers engaged full-time in 
public-interest law is less than 1% of the legal profession in the 
country. 
This account omits the substantial number of lawyers who 
work full-time or part-time for legal-aid societies. But they are 
primarily engaged in defending people against criminal charges; 
to my mind, the part of the law dealing with ordinary criminal 
activity, whether prosecution or defense, is not very relevant to a 
consideration of lawyers as members of a "new class" engaged in 
shaping a new society. Crime, alas, is always with us, and while 
we could examine possible connections between the ideology of 
the "new class" and crime, they would have less significance for 
the history of the "new class" than the expanding role of govern-
ment as the regulator, shaper, and defender of new rights. 
This is one possible way of characterizing the legal profes-
sion: largely self-employed (53%, according to the 1970 Census) 
and overwhelmingly engaged in working for businessmen and the 
wealthy, with less than 20% employed by government, and less 
than 1% engaged in expanding the rights of minorities, the poor, 
and the unrepresented. This has been the point of view of most 
commentators on the legal profession, and has been for some 
time. Writing on The Modern Legal Profession in the 1933 Ency-
clopedia o.f the Social Sciences, A.A. Berle described the American 
bar as follows: 
The complete commercialization of the American Bar has stripped it of any social 
functions it might have performed for individuals without wealth. The great law 
office either does not care to or cannot profitably handle cases which, while of 
great importance to individuals, have only limited financial significance. The 
smaller offices and individual practitioners, especially if they are struggling for 
7. ld at 197. This survey, which covered 30 groups. seems to have missed some 
groups and more have been established since 1973 (and undoubtedly some have gone out 
of busmess). The list of organizations does not include, in the field of mental retardation 
alone, which has grown rapidly since 1973, the Mental Health Law Project, the National 
Center of Law and the Handicapped, the Disability Law Resource Center, and the Mental 
Disability Legal Resource Center. The volume is generally valuable for its survey and 
analysis of the field of public-interest law. 
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survival, will extract the maximum compensation from their clients, whether the 
service is worth it or not. 
Forty-five years later, Roger Cramton, Dean of the Cornell Law 
School and chairman of the Legal Services Corporation, gave a 
similar characterization in a major address to the California state 
bar in 1976: "The most generous estimates indicate that less than 
15% of the legal needs of the poor are being met today .... Less 
than 2,200 lawyers-only about one-half of 1% of the American 
Bar-are working full-time to meet the legal needs of one-sixth of 
the population."s And President Carter, in a widely reported 
speech on May 3, 1978, echoed the same complaint about the 
maldistributed resources of the American bar. Of New York 
City's 35,000 lawyers, he said, "only a handful are available for 
service to the city's one million poor-one for every 5,000." He 
urged the expansion of legal services to the poor, even though, as 
he pointed out in his talk, the United States already has more law-
yers per capita than any nation but Israel. Carter advocated fur-
ther expanding the resources available to the new interest groups 
that sprang up in the later 1960's and 1970's to gain new rights: 
"Overcoming procedural barriers means that groups with distinct 
interests to defend-in civil rights, economic questions, environ-
mental causes, and others-must be able to defend them fully. 
We are supporting efforts to broaden the use of class action and to 
expand the definitions of standing to sue." 
And so we have a paradox, or indeed two, if we consider law-
yers as part of the "new class." First, there are very few public-
interest lawyers, and while there are considerably more lawyers in 
government who may be advancing the interests of the "new 
class," the total number cannot be more than a few percent of the 
American bar. (As I suggested above, most lawyers in govern-
ment are engaged in prosecuting criminals.) Moreover, most law-
yers in public-interest firms see government itself as an enemy, 
indeed the enemy. In what sense, then, could government lawyers 
be representatives of the "new class"? 
Let us consider the second paradox first. The problem with 
the idea of a "new class," as so many contributors to this volume 
have pointed out, is that so many elements are mixed up in it. 
Common to all elements, or almost all, is a rejection of the market 
as a means of allocating wealth, whether on grounds of justice or 
efficiency. But this does not mean a unified and favorable attitude 
to the expansion of governmental powers. This may be the domi-
8. These quotations are from a valuable syllabus for a course on "The Legal Profes-
sion" given by Richard Abel at the U.C.L.A. Law School. 
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nant orientation of the elements we group under the "new class," 
but it is obviously combined with a great suspicion of government, 
as well. Government should be expanded, the "new class" says, 
but it must also be watched closely and monitored from outside 
government, for even as it expands to regulate private business, it 
may be captured by private business. Even if not captured, gov-
ernment might be slack in its enforcement; the energy and enter-
prise that public-interest lawyers characteristically bring to their 
task (and that lawyers generally are socialized in law school to 
expend) might not be found in government servants, including the 
lawyers among them. 
This fear leads to a sharp eye on government regulation. 
Much litigation undertaken by public-interest lawyers against 
government does not, of course, demonstrate a fundamental hos-
tility to government expansion as such, since it is designed to in-
crease the power of government, to force it to take on what it does 
not want to do, to undertake what law or regulation or constitu-
tional interpretation says it should do with more energy and 
greater resources. If this is the attitude of public-interest law to 
government, then it basically has no argument against the expan-
sion of governmental powers. 
But there is another side to public-interest law that is indeed 
fundamentally hostile to government. A long tradition of public-
interest law generally opposes some governmental action on the 
ground that it restricts civil liberties. This branch of public-inter-
est law does want government to do less, and so do many of the 
newer branches dealing with the schools, prisoners, the mentally 
ill, and the mentally retarded. They will argue that records should 
not be kept on students, that students should not be disciplined, 
expelled, or placed in special schools, or that special schools 
should not exist. Similar arguments are made on behalf of prison-
ers, or the mentally ill, or the mentally retarded. "Deinstitutional-
ization," a growing movement strongly assisted by public-interest 
law, asks government to do less and even promises that the cost of 
social services may be reduced if new approaches are adopted. 
Of course, there is a certain selectivity in the defense of rights. 
Not all constitutionally protected rights are equally the concern of 
public-interest groups. For example, consider the right to bear 
arms (the second amendment), or the right to be compensated for 
the "taking" of private property (the fifth amendment). But my 
main point is that the defense of rights, however selective, is often 
a defense against government doing something-and thus, at first 
glance, seems to be a bar to governmental expansion. 
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Another branch of public-interest law is critical of govern-
ment in a different respect. It opposes the power of government-
licensed professions and urges self-help for education, health, and 
other needs, and urges less dependence on the highly trained pro-
fessional. Does this branch also warrant inclusion in the "new 
class"? It is part of the many-faceted revolution of the 1960's, 
which simultaneously expanded the rights of minorities (and the 
number of those to be considered minorities), expanded govern-
ment regulation, and urged radical change in social services. If 
one branch of public-interest law calls for the expansion of gov-
ernment, and another calls for its withdrawal or its restriction, 
what happens to the relationship between public-interest law and 
the "new class"? 
There is an answer to this paradox. Both aspects of public-
interest law-that which expands governmental power and that 
which calls for its restriction-emphasize rights, primarily consti-
tutional rights, but also rights grounded in statute and regulation. 
On the one hand, the right that is asserted requires government to 
do more; on the other, it requires government to do less. And in 
emphasizing rights, the two branches share other common ele-
ments: for example, the insistence that ever more lawyers are 
needed to defend and secure these rights. By operating through 
the courts, even the public-interest lawyers who apparently want 
government to do less are in effect asking that another branch of 
government, the courts, do more. The relationship of public-in-
terest law to governmental expansion differs from the liberalism 
of the New Deal, which saw no problem in expanding government 
to deal with any problem. At least the legal branch of the "new 
class" does see problems with this approach, but its chosen solu-
tion is to expand another branch of government, the judiciary, to 
deal with them. Or, as D.P. Moynihan pointed out in the title of a 
recent address: "An Imperial Presidency leads to an Imperial 
Legislature leads to an Imperial Judiciary."9 
Thus, as a result of a lawsuit charging deprivation of the con-
stitutional rights of the inmates, the Willowbrook Developmental 
Center, a huge center for the retarded on Staten Island in New 
York City, is to be reduced in population from 5,300 to 250. Gov-
ernment, attacked by public-interest lawyers who were defending 
the right of patients to good treatment and not to be placed in an 
institution, was required to reduce one of its monster institutions. 
But the consent judgment resulting from the suit requires that 
9. Lehman Memorial Lecture by Senator Moynihan (Mar. 28, 1978), reprinted as 
Moynihan, Imperial Government, CoMMENTARY, June 1978, at 25. 
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government create hundreds of new mini-institutions to house the 
retarded and many programs in the community to provide them 
with work, education, therapy, and other needs; in doing so, it 
requires not only the expansion of state agencies creating such in-
stitutions and programs, but the creation by the judiciary of a new 
form of government, the Willowbrook Review Panel, to oversee 
the process. But all this is as nothing compared to the need for 
new lawyers that the Willowbrook decree causes by creating and 
specifying a vast array of new rights: the right to community 
placement, the right to six hours of program, the right to notice 
before being moved, the right to be fully informed of one's rights, 
the right to a process of appeal and adjudication if there is disa-
greement over one's rights. The Willowbrook judgment is enough 
to keep an army of lawyers busy for many years, and if the army 
were provided, there would have to be an appropriate increase in 
judges and court personnel to respond to their efforts. 
The passion for rights now knows no bounds. Critical of gov-
ernment, it nevertheless causes an increase in the number of law-
yers. "Deinstitutionalization" may reduce the number of those 
employed in institutions, but it certainly increases the number of 
lawyers. Lawyers in the field of "deinstitutionalization" are con-
vinced that no benevolence can be expected from those who run 
institutions for the mentally retarded and the mentally ill. Ideally, 
each inmate should have a lawyer. The child must be protected 
not only against the state and the mental-health professionals, but 
also against his parents-a point of view that is now actually be-
corning law. A three-judge federal panel in Pennsylvania recently 
ruled that it was unconstitutional to commit mentally ill and men-
tally retarded children to institutions "without a hearing and with-
out legal representation." As part of its ruling the court ordered 
that the 3,390 children now being held in Pennsylvania institu-
tions, both public and private, must be released within the next six 
months or recommitted under the new procedures. to 
One of the main arguments against the "new class" is that, 
seeking good, it finds ways of expanding its own numbers and its 
own power; despite the rather special role of lawyers within the 
"new class," in this respect they resemble government employees, 
social workers, city planners, and all the others who, whatever 
their differences, see more need for more people with their own 
training. This process is not cynical; the public-interest lawyers 
who have created a situation in which ever more of their kind will 
be needed do not rub their hands in sly delight at what they have 
10. PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, May 26, 1978, at I. 
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wrought. Instead, they are wearied and overcome by what they 
see as the heaped-up problems around them, which even great vic-
tories cannot reduce and even seem to magnify. But it is undenia-
ble to them that an increase in their numbers-whether they are 
l/2, or 1, or 2% of the bar-is essential to any progress. 
Even when it is critical of government, the public-interest bar 
generally feels that government should be forced to do more-
more regulating, more enforcing, more monitoring.tt And when it 
wants to limit government, it is in effect expanding another seg-
ment of government-the judiciary. In both cases, it is undoubt-
edly increasing the need for lawyers, within and without 
government. 
But then we come to the first paradox mentioned above: as a 
proportion of all lawyers, the public-interest bar and the regula-
tors and the authors of government regulations do not amount to 
much. Why then are lawyers regarded as members of the "new 
class" rather than opponents, considering their interest as small 
businessmen whose clients are other businessmen, small and 
large? Because the relatively small group of public-interest law-
yers represents an essential thrust of the law itself, something even 
its opponents within the law grudgingly acknowledge. The law is 
a matter of due process and of rights, and if lawyers set themselves 
up to insure due process and to vindicate rights, the bar-
whatever the interests of most of its members and most of its cli-
ents-will go along. The Bar Association, for example, supported 
the creation of legal services for the poor under the Office of Eco-
nomic Opportunity.t2 Some established lawyers might have seen 
it as competition (though the poor do not provide much legal busi-
ness); more might have seen it as threatening the interests of their 
clients-the landlords, employers, manufacturers, and retailers. 
But the ABA decided that government-supported legal services 
for the poor should be backed by the bar, regardless of the clash 
with certain interests, because the law itself incorporates as a key 
principle the right to representation and due process, which only 
lawyers can provide. It is interesting that, despite all the opposi-
tion that developed among governors, mayors, and others, legal 
services handily survived the demise of the Office of Economic 
Opportunity itself, was set up as a separate government corpora-
II. Indeed, members of this part of the public-interest bar find no problem passing 
over into the service of government. Those left behind may suspect a weakening in the 
commitment of their former colleagues, but the easy passage from the outside critical role 
to the inside regulating role shows the close connection. Cameron, Nader's Invaders Are 
Inside the Gates, FoRTUNE, Oct. 1977, at 252. 
12. J. HANDLER, supra note 6, at 32. 
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tion, and was able under a Republican administration both to pro-
tect itself from political hazards and to continue in very much the 
same line as it had started. 
The bar presents the strange spectacle of having interests that 
should be quite critical of governmental expansion, of the exten-
sion of due process, of the creation and extension of new rights. 
After all, these harm lawyers as businessmen (but of course they 
have their own in-house talent to deal with such issues), and harm 
their clients, who employ them to struggle against the untoward 
effects of expanded regulations, rights, and due process. But as 
lawyers they see the compelling logic in these new entitlements. 
How can a lawyer, as a lawyer, resist the demand that everyone 
needs a lawyer---even if he sees a certain fantastic element in, for 
example, a case where all parties agree that institutionalization is 
the best course of action, and yet a lawyer is nevertheless required 
to certify their agreement? 
And because this logic is built into the law itself, it is at its 
strongest in the faculties of law schools, particularly elite law 
schools, where we find the most refined elaborations of due pro-
cess, the most extended implications of a right, and all the various 
developments within American law that have emphasized its role 
in reforming and restructuring society. The bar as a whole may 
be conservative, and its interests suggest that lawyers-if we had 
polls-would have conservative political opinions. But this is not 
true of law-school faculties. While not as liberal as social scien-
tists, they are considerably more liberal than professors in general, 
and the high-status law schools are even more liberal.I3 One can 
see why, despite the easy and jejune interpretations that simply 
assume that law professors, linked to a conservative profession 
serving conservative interests, will obviously be conservative. 
They are liberal because the nature of the law itself emphasizes 
many themes that have become the essence of liberalism: due 
process, a careful consideration of rights, a system of reasoning by 
analogy, which permits moving from restricted conceptions of due 
process to more extended ones. They are liberal, too, because 
law-school faculty are, in very substantial proportions, of Jewish 
ancestry (25%, as against 17% of social-science faculty, 9% of all 
faculty, and 3% of the population), and Jews are liberal.I4 The 
more liberal law schools and the elite law schools (the two catego-
ries overlap), which shape new approaches justifying a more in-
13. S. Lipset & 1. Paris, The Sociology of Law Professors (1977) (unpublished 
manuscript). 
14. ld 
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terventionist profession (interventionist, that is, in favor of the 
kinds of interests the educated elite espouse), attract students in-
clined toward liberalism and toward creative legal intervention 
for the rights of such newly defined minorities as prisoners, the 
mentally ill, and the mentally retarded, and for the protection of 
the environment and the consumer. 
It is true that there has been very little study of the political 
effect of law school attendance. The overwhelming impression 
given by the literature, popular and scholarly, is that law school 
makes law students conservative, interested in making money by 
helping businessmen make money. After all, their courses deal 
primarily with law affecting business, and they expect for the most 
part to work for business. One interesting study of attitudes of 
law students at one major university, contrasting their attitudes 
just before beginning their studies in 1973 with their attitudes af-
ter almost two years oflaw school in 1975, did show a modest drift 
toward a more conservative self-definition. Their interest in doing 
public-interest law also declined. But the changes were only mod-
est, and could have been attributed to their professors (who, 
whatever their liberal inclinations, might have been more con-
servative than their students), or the changing temper of the times, 
or the fact that their self-image was changing as they approached 
the time to begin looking for jobs, or the fact that they were get-
ting older, or some other possible cause. But on the evidence of 
this study, law school prompts no strong shift to conservatism.l 5 
Another key part of the bar diverges from the conservative 
inclinations of most lawyers: the federal judiciary. Federal 
judges are not by training or social background interventionist 
But in recent decades they have supported the expansion of gov-
ernment powers, for varied and complex reasons-among them, 
the fact that Congress, the presidency, and the bureaucracy have 
also expanded governmental powers, and judges simply interpret 
law and regulations. But one reason for this development is that 
appellate judges depend in large measure for their legal reasoning 
on elite law-school faculty who analyze and interpret legal trends 
and point the way to further development, and on the best stu-
dents of elite law schools, who serve as law clerks. As I wrote 
recently, 
the judges follow the weight of judicial analysis and opinion. . . . [l)n . . . com· 
plex cases, they must be guided by what is set before them in lengthy briefs and 
15. H. Erlanger & D. Klegon, Socialization Effects of Professional School: The Law 
School Experience and Student Orientation to Public Interest Concerns ( 1977) (Institute 
for Research on Poverty Discussion Paper, Madison). 
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analyses of complex facts. These analyses are then digested by other lawyers for 
them, generally the brightest graduates of the law schools. But this entire process 
is guided by the weight of educated opinion, an educated opinion which is con-
vinced that morality and progress lie on the side of the broadest possible measures 
of intervention to equalize the employment of minority groups in every sphere 
and level of employment, and to evenly distribute students and teachers and ad-
ministrators [by race] through school districts . . . .16 
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Of course, there are other factors that explain judicial in-
terventionism, among them the independence of the judiciary 
from the opinions of the general public-though not, as I have 
indicated, from educated public opinion. It is of course possible 
that a long line of conservative appointments to the Supreme 
Court and lower courts by a conservative president would moder-
ate the interventionist orientation of the federal judiciary. But the 
tendency toward interventionism-whether the result of judicial 
insulation from the pressures of mass public opinion, of the influ-
ence of legal commentators or legal clerks, or of the steadily more 
expansive interpretation of due process and equal rights-is so 
strong that eight years of Eisenhower appointments did nothing to 
change it, and eight more years of Nixon and Ford appointments 
did little more. 
At its peak-among elite law-school faculty, students in elite 
law schools, the federal judiciary-the law is quite different from 
what a random sample of legal practitioners would show, and 
much closer to the "new class" in its orientation to government 
and business. Despite their small numbers, interventionist law-
yers-the public-interest lawyers, the government regulators-are 
not alone. The corporate body that represents the bar, as we have 
seen, will give them support, even if grudgingly. Distinguished 
law professors will mark out the path they should take, and justify 
it before they have entered upon it. Appellate judges will be influ-
enced in various ways by elite law-school faculties. Lawyers are 
indeed important members of the "new class," if we consider that 
its essential character is to call for, to defend, and to benefit from 
the expansion of government. 
Admittedly, there are other traditions within the law that 
might serve to moderate the expansion of government and the law 
itself. As neither a lawyer nor a philosopher of law, I would hesi-
tate to say that traditions emphasizing restraint and a limited role 
for law rather than its endless expansion are any more authentic 
than traditions that have served the expansion of government and 
law. And it would take a different and more extended discussion 
16. N. GLAZER, AFFIRMATIVE DISCRIMINATION: ETHNIC INEQUALITY AND PUBLIC 
PoucY 218 (1975). 
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to explain why it is that the legal traditions that serve the "new 
class" rather than those who might oppose it have become domi-
nant-not in the law itself as a profession, but in the law schools, 
where it is forcefully carried into the courts, with great effects 
upon our society. 
